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FOR KENNY, WHO WANTED TO PLAY WOMEN’S FIELD HOCKEY 
ADAM S. DAROWSKI* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
An increasing number of women at the professional,1 collegiate,2 and high 
school3 levels are successfully making their way into men’s sports competitions 
and onto men’s athletic teams.  Within this evolving context of gender desegre-
gation and athletic participation, the idea that boys and girls should only com-
pete on separate teams is changing.  Society is increasingly accepting the idea 
that girls who are good enough ought to be able to play on a boys’ team, espe-
cially at high schools where a particular sport is offered for boys only.  The same 
cannot be said for the idea of boys playing on girls’ teams.  Particularly in the 
sports of volleyball4 and field hockey5 administrators are having to deal with the 
 
 * Associate, Winstead, Sechrest & Minick.  J.D., Duke University School of Law, 2004; B.A., 
Brigham Young University.  The author did not play high school field hockey. 
 1. In 2003, Annika Sörenstam became the first female golfer to participate in a men’s profes-
sional golf tour event since 1945 (58 years), by playing in the PGA’s Bank of America Colonial tour-
nament.  Sörenstam played reasonably well, only missing the cut to compete in the final two rounds 
of the four round tournament by four strokes.  Professional Golf Association, Annika Sörenstam, at 
http://www.pgatour.com/u/ce/feature/0,1977,837190,00.html (May 20, 2003). 
 2. In August of 2003, Katie Hnida became the first woman to score points in a Division I-A 
college football game, by kicking an extra point for the University of New Mexico. Katie Hnida 
Timeline: 1998–2004, SI.COM, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2004/football/ncaa/02/16/ 
hnida.timeline/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).  In 2002, Ashley Martin became the first woman to play 
and score in a Division I-AA college football game, by kicking in an extra point for Jacksonville State 
University. It’s Up, It’s Good, CNNSI.COM, at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/college/ 
news/2001/08/30/woman_kicker_ap/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2005). 
 3. For instance, the members of the National Federation of State High School Associations 
(“NFSHSA”) reported that during the 2003 high school football season, 1,615 girls played on high 
school football teams nationwide.  NAT’L FEDERATION OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, NFHS 2003-04 
HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETICS PARTICIPATION SURVEY 46 (2004), http://www.nfhs.org/scriptcontent/ 
VA_Custom/SurveyResources/2003_04_Participation_Summary.pdf. 
 4. The members of the National Federation of State High School Associations reported female 
volleyball teams in forty-nine states and the District of Columbia during the 2003-04 school year. See 
NAT’L FEDERATION OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, NFHS 2003-04 HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETICS 
PARTICIPATION SURVEY 60 (2004), http://www.nfhs.org/scriptcontent/VA_Custom/Survey 
Resources/2003_04_Participation.pdf. In contrast, only twenty two state athletic associations 
reported at least one male volleyball team during for the 2003-04 school year.  Id.at 53. 
 5. Reports from fifty state high school athletic associations plus the District of Columbia indi-
cate that girls’ field hockey was played in 20 states during the 2003-2004 school year, clustered 
mainly in New England and the Upper Middle Atlantic region: California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia and Wash-
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legal and policy questions behind whether boys legally can and normatively 
should be allowed to play on girls’ teams.  This note will focus on the sport of 
high school field hockey and analyze whether, under Title IX6 or the Equal Pro-
tection Clause,7 public high schools must allow boys to try out for and play on 
their girls’ field hockey teams. 
In analyzing the issue of whether boys should be allowed to play on girls’ 
high school field hockey teams, this note will provide (1) an overview of the 
scope and history of boys playing on girls’ high school field hockey teams,8 (2) a 
discussion of Title IX9 and the Equal Protection Clause,10 and (3) a comparison of 
the differing judicial opinions from states where this matter has been litigated.11  
Throughout this note, the author will make reference to a fictional character 
named Kenny,12 a high school boy too small to play football and too short to play 
basketball, but just right for field hockey, and discuss—apart from the legal is-
sues—whether Kenny should be allowed to play on a girls’ high school field 
hockey team. 
II.  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
A. Scope and History of Boys’ Participation in Girls’ High School Field Hockey 
After a largely unsuccessful spat of lawsuits attempting to allow high 
school boys to play on girls’ teams in the late 1970s and early 1980s,13 boys are 
 
ington. See id. at 57. Only three states— California, Vermont and Massachusetts— reported male 
field hockey participation. Id. at 55. 
 6. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). 
 7. U.S.CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
 8. See infra Part I. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. Kenny is a fictional creation of the author’s imagination and is not meant to be based on any 
actual person. 
 13. See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass’n, 995 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the ex-
clusion of boys from a girls’ volleyball team is acceptable under Fourteenth Amendment); Petrie v. 
Illinois High Sch. Ass’n, 394 N.E.2d 855, 864 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that the exclusion of boys 
from a girls’ volleyball team is acceptable under state constitution and Fourteenth Amendment); B.C. 
v. Board of Educ., Cumberland Regional Sch. Dist., 531 A.2d 1059, 1065 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1987) 
(holding that the exclusion of boys from a girls’ field hockey team is acceptable under Title IX and 
the federal constitution); Mularadelis v. Haldane Cent. Sch. Bd., 427 N.Y.S.2d 458, 464 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1980) (holding that the exclusion of boys from a girls’ volleyball team is acceptable under Title 
IX and state and federal constitution); Forte v. Bd. of Ed., N. Babylon Union Free Sch. Dist., 105 Misc. 
2d 36, 39–40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding that the exclusion of boys from a girls’ volleyball team is 
acceptable under state law); But see Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 
665-66 (D.R.I.) vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding that where only a girls’ team ex-
ists, boys may not be excluded from volleyball team; decided under both Title IX and the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Attorney Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 393 N.E.2d 284 (Mass. 
1979) (under state’s new equal rights amendment, blanket exclusion from boy’s participation on 
girls’ teams is unconstitutional). 
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once again going to court to get onto girls’ high school athletic teams, particu-
larly girls’ field hockey teams.14  As the Wall Street Journal reported in 1998, 
Some teenage boys are suing for the right to run around school athletic fields in 
pleated skirts.  In an unusual legal twist, they have been using sex discrimina-
tion laws to try to get onto girls’ sports teams.  Most of these cases involve field 
hockey, which in this country has traditionally been played by girls.15 
The game of field hockey, where two 11-person teams try to hit a ball through a 
goal on a field using sticks,16 is among the world’s oldest sports.17  The modern 
version of field hockey evolved in nineteenth century England where the first 
women’s club was formed in 1887.18  Field hockey was transported to America—
by a woman—in the early twentieth century.19  While a sport mainly played by 
men in the rest of the world,20 in the United States field hockey is a game played 
almost exclusively by women.  There are currently zero school-sponsored high 
school or college men’s field hockey teams.21   
There is no consensus among the states in which girls’ high school field 
hockey is played as to whether boys should also be allowed to participate.  Mas-
sachusetts became the first state to declare the blanket exclusion of boys from 
girls’ high school athletic teams unconstitutional in 1979.22  Boys have been play-
ing girls’ field hockey there for over 20 years.  Boys can also play in New York,23 
and some parts of Pennsylvania.24  In Maryland, local school districts may let 
boys play field hockey in the regular season, but boys are not permitted to play 
 
 14. See Erin White, Court Sports: Boys Sue to Play With Girls, WALL ST. J., August 5, 1998, at B1. 
 15. Id. 
16 This brief statement obviously does not do justice to the complexity of the game. 
 17. The United States Field Hockey Association reports that “the sport of field hockey dates 
back well before the Ancient Olympic Games. Although the exact origin of the game remains un-
known, 4,000-year-old drawings found in the tomb at Beni-Hasen in the Nile Valley of Egypt de-
picted men playing the sport. Throughout the following centuries, variations of the game were 
played by a spectrum of cultures ranging from Greeks and Romans to Ethiopians and Aztecs.”  U.S. 
Field Hockey Ass’n, Field Hockey History,, at http://www.usfieldhockey.com/history/ (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2005). 
 18. “With more and more women becoming active in the sport, the liberating game of field 
hockey earned the dubious title as the only team sport considered proper for women.” Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. “Even though field hockey is as male as jock itch everywhere else in the world, the U.S. has 
zero boys’ high school teams.”  Rick Reilly, Editorial, Not Your Average Skirt-Chasers, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 26, 2001 at 100. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Attorney Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 393 N.E.2d 284 (Mass. 1979). 
 23. Rick Reilly opined in a Sports Illustrated editorial that “Boys are a problem that’s whittling 
away the fabric of field hockey in Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania.”  Reilly, supra note 
20. 
 24. Pennsylvania is a state where individual schools can choose whether to allow boys on their 
girls’ field hockey teams. Because of a state court ruling on the states Equal Rights Amendment there 
is no state-wide prohibition. Randy Pennell, Boys Find it’s Not Easy Playing With Girls, 
PHILLYBURBS.COM, at http://www.phillyburbs.com/pb-dyn/news/103-12072003-208807.html  (Dec. 
7, 2003). 
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in the state tournament.25  Boys have lost legal challenges to rules excluding 
them from playing on girls’ high school field hockey teams in Maine,26 New Jer-
sey,27 and Rhode Island.28 
B. Arguments Against a Boy’s Right to Play 
The idea of boys playing on girls’ field hockey teams could be seen as vio-
lating traditional—although arguably paternalistic and increasingly outdated—
notions of fairness.  For instance, scientific data shows that most high school 
aged boys are bigger, faster, and stronger than most high school aged girls.29  
These physiological differences could give boys playing field hockey against 
girls an unfair competitive advantage. 
This perception of fairness has not been lost on courts deciding whether 
boys should be allowed to play girls’ field hockey.  The Superior Court of Maine 
for Cumberland County, for instance, in upholding that states’ ban on boys 
playing girls’ high school field hockey, noted: 
as a consequence of their physiological advantages, boys have the capacity to 
dominate integrated field hockey games.  Anecdotally, they do dominate.  They 
handle the ball and control the play of the game such that their impact on the 
game is disproportionate to their numbers.  This is so largely irrespective of 
their skill and experience.  Anecdotally, boys of similar age and experience      
intimidate girls and affect the way girls play field hockey.30 
Players, parents, and coaches complain about the inherent unfairness of larger 
and stronger boys playing on girls’ high school field hockey teams.  Female par-
ticipants have said of playing field hockey with their male counterparts: “Play-
ing with boys is awful!  When you win, people think it’s only because of the boys 
on your team.  It’s so defeating.”31  After playing against a high school junior 
varsity team in Massachusetts with a 5’10”, 210 pound boy, a freshman girl said, 
“I was scared, and I don’t think he has the right to come into our game and 
 
 25. See Pat O’Malley, Boy Field Hockey Players Plan to Appeal Playoff Ban, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 5, 
2003, at 14E; Pat O’Malley, In Fall, Athletes Aced Academic Test,  BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 13, 2004, at 7C. 
 26. Me. Human Rights Comm’n. v. Me. Principals Ass’n, No. CV-97-599, 1999 Me. Super. Lexis 
23, at *1 (Me. Super., Jan. 21, 1999). 
 27. B.C. v. Board of Educ., Cumberland Regional Sch. Dist., 531 A.2d 1059 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. 
Div. 1987). 
 28. See Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, Inc., 612 A.2d 734, (R.I. 1992). 
 29. See generally KURT FISCHER & ARLYNE LAZERSON, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 567-570 (1984) (“Be-
fore adolescence, boys and girls of similar size and shape are also similar in strength. But at the end 
of the growth period, boys’ muscles are both bigger and stronger . . . . [B]oys also develop larger 
hearts and lungs, greater capacity for carrying oxygen in the blood, a lower heart rate while at rest, 
and a greater capacity for neutralizing the chemical products of muscular exercise that produce feel-
ings of fatigue.”); Robert M. Malina, Motor Development and Performance, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 249-50 (Stanley J. Ulijaszek et al. eds., 1998) 
(“[S]ex differences in motor performance become marked during adolescence, such that few girls 
perform as well as average boys in many strength, power, and speed tasks in later adolescence.”); 
Jerry R. Thomas & Karen E. French, Gender Differences Across Age in Motor Performance: A Meta-
Analysis, 98 PSYCHOL. BULL. 260 (1985). 
 30. See Me. Human Rights Comm’n. 1999 Me. Super. Lexis 23, at *14-15. 
 31. Reilly, supra note 20, at 100. 
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make us scared.  Besides, what self-respecting guy would wear a skirt to play a 
game?”32  Safety is a major concern.  An administrator seeking to keep boys out 
of girls’ field hockey games in Maryland told The Washington Times, “Our objec-
tion [to boys playing] was that the athletes would be put at physical risk.”33 
A separate argument against allowing boys to play on girls’ high school 
field hockey teams—aside from the competitive fairness issues—is that “girls 
could lose their playing time or their position on the team if boys are allowed to 
play.”34  This outcome would seem to fly in the face of Title IX, which was       
arguably meant solely to promote women’s opportunities.35  The Third Circuit 
wrote, 
we must note that although title IX and the regulation apply equally to boys as 
well as girls, it would require blinders to ignore that the motivation for promul-
gation of the regulation on athletics was the historic emphasis on boys’ athletic 
programs to the exclusion of girls’ athletic programs in high schools as well as 
colleges.36 
In summary, apart from the legal arguments that will be addressed, com-
pelling normative arguments can be made that boys should not be allowed to 
play on girls’ high school field hockey teams.  Boys generally possess competi-
tive physiological advantages over high school girls and when boys make it onto 
a field hockey team, the boys necessarily displace girls from those roster spots. 
C. Arguments In Favor of a Boy’s Right to Play 
Still, boys can make compelling and persuasive arguments that they should 
be allowed to play on girls’ high school field hockey teams.  For instance, inter-
nationally, field hockey is predominantly a male sport.37  Since no boys’ high 
school field hockey teams exist,38 one of the few chances high school aged boys 
who want to play have is to play on girls teams. 
In addition, prohibiting boys from playing on girls’ field hockey teams 
smacks of governmental paternalism—a state-sponsored attempt to protect “the 
weaker sex”39 from male “hulking teenage piles of testosterone.”40  An attorney 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Bob Cohn, Playing Like a Girl is Goal For Boys, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at A01. 
 34. Jamie Kovach, No Boys Allowed, SILVER CHIPS ONLINE, at http://silverchips.mbhs.edu/ 
inside.php?sid=873 (Oct. 4, 2002) (quoting Ned Sparks, executive director of the Maryland Public 
Secondary Schools Athletic Association). 
 35. See Polly S. Woods, Comment, Boys Muscling in on Girls’ Sports, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 891, 898 
(1992) (“Under the plain meaning of the regulation, courts have generally reasoned that boys need 
not be provided the opportunity to participate on girls’ teams under a Title IX claim because athletic 
opportunities have not previously been limited for members of their sex.  This contention is un-
doubtedly difficult to dispute.”). 
 36. Williams v. School District of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 176 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 37. Reilly, supra note 20, at 100. 
 38. Id. 
 39. “From the emergence of organized athletics in the United States in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, sports have been deemed the rough and tumble site for inculcating and solidifying the mascu-
line identity; not an appropriate place for ‘the weaker sex.’”  Suzanne Sangree, Title IX and the Con-
tact Sports Exception: Gender Stereotypes in a Civil Rights Statute, 32 CONN. L. REV. 381, 401 (2000). 
 40. Reilly, supra note 20, at 100. 
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who successfully represented a boy seeking to play girls’ field hockey in Massa-
chusetts told the Wall Street Journal, “It was demeaning for the girls to be told 
that it was unsafe for them to play against a team where there was a boy.”41  A 
Rhode Island trial judge found that “[t]he ban of boys is based on archaic and 
overbroad generalizations and assumptions about female athletic ability.”42  An 
attorney trying to help a boy play field hockey noted that while keeping boys 
out of girls’ sports “seemed to make common sense 10 years ago,” the issue “has 
to be looked at again, and looked at more carefully, because the numbers have 
changed, and the opportunities for girls have changed.”43 
Furthermore, the exclusion of high school boys from girls’ field hockey 
does seem like reverse discrimination, especially at schools where girls are per-
mitted to play on boys teams.  “It’s basically sexist that guys can’t play,” says 
one boy excluded from field hockey participation in Maryland.44  This would ar-
guably be an easier issue if all the boys who wanted to play field hockey were 
over six feet tall and weighed more than 200 pounds.  But many boys who want 
to play are essentially the same size as the girls.45  In their cases, the arguments 
for exclusion based on competitive fairness or safety concerns would be unper-
suasive. 
Assume for upcoming discussion that Kenny46 is small for an average boy 
his age, with a height of ‘5” and a weight of 135 pounds.  His strength and 
quickness are average in comparison to the girls on his high school’s field 
hockey team.  Based on competitive tryouts he was good enough to make the 
squad, though he certainly did not stand out.  Unfortunately for Kenny, he lives 
in a state that excludes boys from participation on girls’ high school athletic 
teams.  His only recourse is to challenge this state provision in court to see if it 
violates Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The balance of this note will analyze those provisions and the ways courts have 
interpreted them, with a brief conclusion regarding whether Kenny should be 
allowed to play.47 
 
 41. White, supra note 14, at B1. 
 42. Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, No. 91-5475, 1991 R.I. Super. LEXIS 101, at *16 (R.I. Su-
per., Sept. 27, 1991), vacated by,  612 A. 2d 734 (R.I. 1992). 
 43. White, supra note 14, at B1.. 
 44. See Kovach, supra note 34 (quoting Arman Mizani, a high school senior turned away from 
his high school’s field hockey tryouts in Maryland). 
 45. See e.g. Cohn, supra note 33, at A01 (highlighting the desire to play field hockey of two boys 
who are 5’9”, 160 pounds, and 5’7”, 135 pounds respectively); White, supra, note 14 (highlighting a 
boy who stood 5’6”, 145 pounds). 
 46. See supra note 12. 
 47. See infra Part IV. 
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III.  TITLE  IX 
A. An Overview of Title IX 
Prior to recent decades, most sporting activities in the United States have 
been played by and organized on behalf of men rather than women.48  To pro-
vide more opportunities for women, Title IX was adopted by the United States 
Congress in 1982.49  The passing of Title IX is intimately connected to a skyrock-
eting growth in women’s athletics in America.  “Title IX has helped girls and 
women participate in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics in far greater 
numbers than they had in the past.”50  Of interesting note, however, is that Title 
IX itself says nothing about athletics.  “Indeed, the statute’s application to athlet-
ics was barely mentioned before it was enacted in 1972.”51  So what exactly is  Ti-
tle IX and how did athletics, including high school field hockey, come within its 
purview? 
Title IX, a gender equality statute, was proposed as an amendment to Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.52  Title VI provided that “No person in the 
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”53  The pur-
pose of Title IX was to apply the same standard prohibiting racial discrimination 
to gender discrimination.54  The language of Title IX mirrors that of Title VI: “No 
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”55 
On its face Title IX does not mention athletics at all.  “While it is clear from 
the legislative history that Title IX was modeled on Title VI (which did apply to 
athletics), and that it was meant to have broad effect in undoing pervasive sex 
discrimination, its application to athletics was rarely explicitly considered until 
after its enactment.”56  The role of Title IX in providing for gender equality in 
athletics first emerged with the creation of implementation regulations, a job   
assigned by Congress to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
 
 48. See generally Nancy L. Malcom, Constructing Female Athleticism, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 
1387 (2003) (“Throughout history, the sporting arena has been a male domain, described as a ‘male 
preserve’ where boys take part in a ‘masculine rite of passage’ to join the ranks of ‘real’ men.”) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 49. 20 U.S.C. § 1681, supra note 6. 
 50. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., TITLE IX: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/ 
TitleIX/part5.html (1997). 
 51. Sangree, supra note 39, at 387. 
 52. Robert R. Hunt, Implementation and Modification of Title IX Standards: The Evolution of Athletics 
Policy, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 51, 58 (1999). 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2005). 
 54. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 and amend. XIX (noting that this pattern of advances in the 
prevention of the racial discrimination preceding advances in women’s rights occurred at an earlier 
time in United States history, as non-White men were given the right to vote before women of any 
color.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1, and amend. XIX. 
 55. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 56. Sangree, supra note 39, at 412. 
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(HEW).57  HEW “chose to give the statute a very broad interpretation, substan-
tially expanding its coverage and the agency’s own power of enforcement.”58 
Within its broad interpretation of the coverage of Title IX, HEW saw fit to 
promulgate regulations regarding participation in extracurricular activities 
sponsored by entities receiving federal funding, including high school athletic 
teams.59  HEW’s 1975 policy interpretation of Title IX stated in part, 
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, be treated differently from or otherwise be discriminated against 
in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a 
recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on such 
basis.60 
Including athletics under the umbrella of Title IX’s coverage proved quite 
controversial at the time.  Several pieces of legislation were proposed to exempt 
athletics from HEW’s inclusion of them within the scope of Title IX.  The Tower 
Amendment,61 which did not pass, would have limited Title IX’s scope with    
regards to athletics quite severely.62  The Javits Amendment did pass however, 
requiring HEW to make “reasonable provisions considering the nature of par-
ticular sports”63 such as field hockey.  Responsibility for overseeing and imple-
menting Title IX, including HEW’s inclusion of athletics, was later given to the 
Department of Education and its Office of Civil Rights.64 
B. Title IX and High School Field Hockey 
High school field hockey fits within the scope of Title IX’s regulation         
regarding athletics (the “regulation”) for two reasons.  First, though much of the 
discussion concerning Title IX and athletics has focused mainly on collegiate 
sports, high schools do receive “federal financial assistance.”65  In 1997, for      in-
stance, the Department of Education reported that almost 15,000 school districts 
with 51,700,000 elementary and secondary students, received federal funds.66  
Even if high school sports are not funded by federal dollars, if a school receives 
any federal financial support, its athletic programs must comply with Title IX.  
Furthermore, on its face the regulation applies to “interscholastic” athletics, 
 
 57. Hunt, supra note 52, at 61. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Proposed Title IX Regulations, 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228-240 (June 20, 1974). 
 60. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a) (1975). 
 61. See Sangree, supra note 39, at 414 (the amendment was named after Senator John Tower of 
Texas). 
 62. “This section shall not apply to an intercollegiate activity insofar as such activity provides to 
the institutions gross receipts or donations required by such institutions to support that activity.”  
120 CONG. REC. 15,322 (1974). 
 63. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 845 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1998)).  See generally Hunt, supra 
note 52, at 64. 
 64. David Aronberg, Crumbling Foundations: Why Recent Judicial and Legislative Challenges to Title 
IX May Signal its Demise, 47 FLA. L. REV. 741, 754 (1995). 
 65. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). 
 66. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., TITLE IX: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, http://www.ed.gov/pubs/ 
TitleIX/part3.html (1997). 
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meaning high school sports.  Second, since field hockey is considered a girls’ 
sport at all high schools at which it is played,67 those high schools must comply 
with the regulation’s provision regarding school sponsorship of a team for one 
sex with no corresponding team for the other: 
(b) Separate Teams.  Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this 
section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each 
sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity 
involved is a contact sport.  However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a 
team in a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no 
such team for members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members 
of that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be 
allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact 
sport.  For purposes of this part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, 
ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of 
which involves bodily contact.68 
Understanding field hockey’s place within this statutory framework will 
require a detailed and extensive analysis.  Since with regard to high school field 
hockey, “a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of 
one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members of the other sex,”69 the 
analysis will focus on the latter half of the above regulation rather than the ini-
tial/introductory half.  The relevant factors in deciding whether a high school 
can keep Kenny from playing on a girls’ field hockey team under Title IX are (1) 
whether athletic opportunities for Kenny’s sex (male) have not previously been 
limited (the “athletic opportunity test”), and (2) whether field hockey is a con-
tact sport (the “contact sports exception”).70  Stated briefly, if field hockey is con-
sidered a contact sport, then a high school can keep Kenny off of its girls’ field 
hockey team without even looking at the athletic opportunity test.  However, if 
field hockey is not considered a contact sport, then a high school could only    
exclude Kenny from participating on the girls’ team only if athletic opportuni-
ties for males at Kenny’s high school have not previously been limited. 
C. The Athletic Opportunity Test 
The first question needing an answer in this Title IX analysis is what is 
meant by the phrase, “and athletic opportunities for [the excluded] sex have previously 
been limited”?71  Where a high school sponsors a girls-only field hockey team, 
boys are necessarily excluded.  This would seem to be allowed under the regula-
tion as long as athletic opportunities for boys have not been limited in the past—
with the comparison being to the athletic opportunities of girls at the high 
school.  The regulation, under this line of reasoning, could be read as saying: 
However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a field hockey team for girls only 
but operates or sponsors no such team for boys, and athletic opportunities for 
 
 67. See supra note 5. 
 68. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2004). 
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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boys in general, compared with girls at the high school, have previously been limited, 
boys must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is 
a contact sport. 
Clearly, “in general,” boys’ high school athletic opportunities in relation to those 
of high school girls have not been limited in the past, at least at most high 
schools.72 
But suppose the regulation needs to be read specifically with regard to field 
hockey rather than generally with regard to all sports.  Another reading of the 
regulation with regard to field hockey specifically could be: 
However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a field hockey team for girls only 
but operates or sponsors no such team for boys, and athletic opportunities for 
boys have previously been limited in the sport of high school field hockey at the high 
school, then boys must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport 
involved is a contact sport. 
As this note has already addressed, there can be no question that athletic oppor-
tunities for high school boys in the sport of high school field hockey have indeed 
been limited in the past in relation to those of girls. 
So under the two possible readings of the phrase, “and athletic opportunities 
for members of that sex have previously been limited,” courts interpreting the statute 
could reach (and have reached) completely opposite outcomes.73  If the phrase is 
meant to cover athletic opportunities in general, then boys’ opportunities have 
not previously been limited and Kenny can be excluded from trying out for the 
team regardless of whether field hockey is a contact sport.  However, if the 
phrase is read to mean athletic opportunities solely within the sport of field 
hockey, then boys’ opportunities have certainly previously been limited.  Thus, 
Kenny must be allowed to try out for the high school field hockey team unless 
field hockey is a contact sport. 
D. The Contact Sports Exception 
The contact sports exception allows sports involving a large amount of 
bodily contact to be “exempt from Title IX’s guarantee of equality.”74  This 
means that schools do not need to provide equal athletic opportunities for boys 
and girls, or stated differently, can discriminate between gender participation—
in the sports of “boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and 
other sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact.”75  
The Third Circuit has called this exemption “the broadest exception recognized 
 
 72. See NAT’L FEDERATION OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, supra note 3, at 47 (providing a statistical 
breakdown of the number of boys and girls participating in high school sports from 1972 until 2004). 
 73. See Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 665 (D.R.I. 1979) (“A 
separate and exclusive female team may be established only when males previously had, and pre-
sumably continue to have, adequate athletic opportunities to participate in that sport.”), vacated as 
moot,, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979). But see Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 768 F. 
Supp. 951, 955 (D.R.I. 1991) (“other courts have called into question Gomes’s construction of the regu-
lation”). 
 74. Sangree, supra note 39, at 382. 
 75. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2004). 
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to the overarching goal of equal athletic opportunity.”76  Others have called it “a 
living Godzilla amongst extinct T-Rexes,” because it “remains as de jure, facial 
sex discrimination” in a time when “virtually all overt, de jure forms of sex dis-
crimination have been eliminated.”77  But these criticisms appear somewhat    
unfounded in light of the current increases in participation by high school girls 
in the very sports exempted by the regulation, as well as non-contact sports.78 
Field hockey is not among the sports specifically listed in the regulation, 
which as a matter of law are considered contact sports.  The sports listed include 
only boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, and basketball.79  However, 
the regulation provides for the inclusion of other athletic endeavors within the 
fold of the contact sports exception by stating “other sports the purpose or major 
activity of which involves bodily contact.”80  Thus, field hockey can fall within the 
scope of the contact sports exemption if either (1) the purpose of field hockey is 
bodily contact, or (2) the major activity of field hockey involves bodily contact. 
Determining what the purpose of a particular sport is can become more of a 
philosophical exercise than a meaningful legal inquiry.  Most people would 
probably say that apart from recreational fun or exercise, the “purpose” behind 
playing a particular sport is to win.  Still, one could argue that the “purpose” 
behind boxing, wrestling, and football, for instance, is the creation of bodily con-
tact between opponents.  Physical contact, including hard contact, is intended.  
This is not the case with field hockey.  The more fruitful inquiry here will be to 
determine what the “major activity” of field hockey is and whether that activity 
“involves” bodily contact. 
At its most fundamental level, the “major activity” of field hockey is hitting 
a ball with a stick in order to score a goal.  While players are running around 
trying to hit the ball with a stick during a field hockey game, bodily contact is 
involved.  The players collide, jostle for position, push, shove, body-check, trip, 
and run into one another.  Such contact is inevitable.  Hard or purposeful con-
tact is against the rules and can result in a foul or penalty being assessed.  In this 
sense the sport of field hockey is akin to basketball, where physical contact      
between players is simply inevitable (and expected) but many types of touching 
can result in fouls.  Basketball was considered a contact sport in the Title IX 
regulations.81  Boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, and basketball all 
undeniably involve and allow bodily contact in the pursuit of the particular 
games’ objectives.  In contrast, in sports like golf, tennis, bowling, badminton, 
track and field, rowing, skiing, volleyball, gymnastics, softball, and even base-
ball bodily contact between opponents is rare and not an essential part of the 
game.  Field hockey is more similar to the sports listed in the regulation as con-
tact sports than the sports just mentioned that really do not involve bodily con-
 
 76. Williams v. School District of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 77. Sangree, supra note 39, at 383-85. 
 78. See supra note 3 (showing that 1,615 girls played high school football nationwide during the 
2003-2004 school year and that 4,008 girls competed in wrestling). 
 79. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2004). 
 80. Id. (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. 
080305 DAROWSKI.DOC 11/11/2005  9:16 AM 
164 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 12:153 2005 
tact.  Under this line of reasoning, field hockey should be considered a contact 
sport. 
In cases where field hockey experts have testified or been used as expert 
witnesses on this point, no consensus has emerged.  For instance, in Williams v. 
School District of Bethlehem,82 both sides filed affidavits by field hockey experts. 
The affidavit of the Director of Development and Marketing for the Field 
Hockey Association of America stated that “field hockey is technically, and     
according to the national and international rules which govern the play of the 
game, a non-contact sport.”83  Reaching an opposite conclusion, a former United 
States Field Hockey Women’s Team coach stated that field hockey should be 
considered a contact sport.84  The coach explained that the major activities of the 
sport of field hockey include running up and down the field attempting to score 
a goal or preventing the other team from doing so and that these activities, “in-
evitably produce and involve bodily contact.”85 
Whether field hockey is properly considered a contact sport within the 
meaning of the regulation is an open question for judicial determination.  If 
courts find that field hockey is a contact sport then Kenny can (not must) be     
excluded from his girls’ high school field hockey team even if a court determines 
it matters that boys’ field hockey opportunities at the high school level have 
been limited in the past.  If a court finds that the athletic opportunities test 
should apply generally to all sports, then the contact sports exception really 
does not matter.  Kenny would not be able to argue that he has a right under   
Title IX to play girls field hockey at his high school.  Seeking an alternative route 
to inclusion, Kenny turns next to the United States Constitution. 
IV.  THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states “No state 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”86  Before and immediately after the passage of Title IX and its implemen-
tation regulations in the 1970s, this clause was used successfully to strike down 
rules prohibiting girls from playing on boys’ high school teams where the high 
school only offered a boys’ team in a particular sport.87  The conclusion drawn 
 
 82. 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 83. Id. at 172. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 87. See Brenden v. Independent Sch. Dist.,. 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (stopping enforcement 
of state rule excluding girls from playing on boys’ teams in non-contact sports); Morris v. Michigan 
State Bd. Of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973) (prohibiting schools from excluding girls from par-
ticipation of boys’ tennis team); Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 444 F. Supp. 117 
(E.D. Wis. 1978) (rescinding rule disallowing girls from playing on boys’ baseball teams); Hoover v. 
Meikljohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977) (rescinding rule disallowing girls from playing on boys’ 
soccer teams); Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 415 F. Supp. 569 (E. D. Tenn. 1976) 
(rescinding rule disallowing girls from playing on boys’ tennis teams); Reed v. Nebraska Sch. Activi-
ties Ass’n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972) (stopping enforcement of state rule excluding girls from 
playing on boys’ golf and basketball teams); Haas v. South Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 
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from these cases is that courts will use the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit 
gender discrimination in high school athletics, “at least with regard to girls’    
access to boys’ teams.”88  But what about boys’ access to girls’ teams? 
A. Redressing Past Discrimination and Promoting Women’s Athletic Opportu-
nities 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that state-sponsored, gender-
based exclusions will be reviewed under an intermediate level of scrutiny.89  In 
order to be in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment, an act such as       
excluding all boys from playing on a girls’ high school field hockey team must 
“serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.”90  The two important governmental objectives 
courts have recognized in allowing states to exclude boys from girls’ high school 
athletic teams are (1) “redressing past discrimination against women in athlet-
ics,”91 and (2) “maintaining, fostering, and promoting athletic opportunities for 
girls.”92 
The need to redress past discrimination against women in high school ath-
letics is (arguably) lessening.  The number of girls playing high school sports 
reached 2,865,299 during the 2003-2004 school year according to the National 
Federation of State High School Associations.93  The number of boys playing 
high sports that year was 4,038,253.94  The gap in participation was 1,172,954.  
That gap is mostly accounted for by the 1,032,682 boys who played high school 
football that year.95  Furthermore, the number of girls playing high school sports 
has increased each year since 1983, when only 1,779,972 girls played.96  Numbers 
like these are beginning to indicate that state high school athletic associations are 
succeeding in “maintaining, fostering, and promoting athletic opportunities for 
girls.”97  Thus, as more and more girls are able to play high school sports—
including sports like football and baseball,98 which have traditionally been boys’ 
sports—the necessity for excluding boys from girls’ teams in order to redress 
past discrimination and promote female athletics will dwindle away.99 
 
(Ind. 1972) (rescinding rule disallowing girls from playing on boys’ golf team); Darrin v. Gould, 540 
P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975) (rescinding rule disallowing girls from playing on boys’ football teams). 
 88. Woods, supra note 35, at 892. 
 89. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 90. Id. at 197. 
 91. Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 92. Petrie v. Illinois High Sch. Ass’n, 394 N.E.2d 855, 862 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). 
 93. See NAT’L FEDERATION OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, supra  note 3, at 47. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Petrie, 394 N.E.2d at 862. 
 98. See NAT’L FEDERATION OF STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’NS, supra  note 3, at 46 (reporting that 1,924 
high school girls played boys’ baseball during the 2003-2004 school year). 
 99. See Woods, supra note 35, at 897 (“It is acknowledged by the author that at some point this 
rationale must fail—the point at which athletic opportunities for males do not exceed those afforded 
their female counterparts.  However, the legitimacy of redressing past discrimination still holds true 
today.” ). 
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B. Reasonable Distinctions Between High School Boys and Girls 
Apart from redressing past discrimination and promoting girls’ athletics, 
an additional rationale for excluding boys from girls’ high school athletic teams 
has also been recognized by courts.  Gender-based preferences can be upheld 
under the Fourteenth Amendment if they are “founded upon a reasonable dis-
tinction” between the sexes.100  The Ninth Circuit has noted that the physical dif-
ferences between the average male and female high school athletes could justify 
gender based classifications.101  Courts have certainly taken note of these physio-
logical differences, stating, “at the high school level, the average male is objec-
tively more physically capable than the average female.”102  This rationale would 
seem then to provide a concrete justification for excluding boys from girls’ 
teams at least under the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of the level of fe-
male athletic participation. 
Still, this is not all bad news for Kenny.  The Supreme Court has also ruled 
that gender-based exclusions justified by “archaic and stereotypic notions” 
about the sexes must be rescinded.103  It is an open question as to whether ex-
cluding boys from playing on girls’ high school field hockey teams because most 
high school boys are bigger, faster, and stronger than most high school girls 
would classify as exclusion based on “archaic and stereotypic notions.”  Courts 
could reasonably read it that way, since “to immunize girls’ teams totally from 
any possible contact with boys might well perpetuate a psychology of ‘romantic 
paternalism’ inconsistent with such development of [competitive female athlet-
ics] and hurtful to it in the long run.”104 
The once airtight reasoning for allowing boys to be excluded from girls’ 
teams even under the Equal Protection Clause is beginning to weaken.  As more 
and more girls participate in high school athletics, the need to redress past ineq-
uities or to promote female athletic participation at the expense of male partici-
pation is going away.  Likewise, the generalization that boys should be excluded 
due to a “reasonable distinction” regarding the physical capabilities between the 
sexes is starting to look “archaic and overbroad.”  Still, courts must ultimately 
make these determinations. 
V.  FIVE LAWSUITS ADDRESSING A BOY’S RIGHT TO PLAY 
Five lawsuits have addressed the issue of whether high school boys have 
the right to play girls’ high school field hockey.  Only one eventually resulted in 
giving boys the right to play.  What follows is a discussion of each lawsuit, with 
an analysis of each court’s treatment of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, 
as well as any other bases for their decisions. 
 
 100. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974) (quoting Allied Shores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 
(1959)); see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280-82 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976); 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975). 
 101. Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass’n, 995 F.2d 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 102. Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 662 (D.R.I. 1979). 
 103. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982). 
 104. Attorney Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 393 N.E.2d 284 (Mass. 1979). 
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A.  The Cases 
1. Williams v. The School District of Bethlehem105 
In the fall of 1990, John Williams, a fourteen-year-old freshman at Liberty 
High School in Pennsylvania, tried out for the school’s girls’ field hockey team.  
He had played coed intramural field hockey in junior high school, and wanted 
to continue playing.  Along with another boy, John made it through the tryout 
process and was selected as a goalie for the junior varsity team.  Before the sea-
son began however, the school district notified John’s coach that boys could not 
play on the girls’ field hockey team and that Williams could neither practice 
with the team nor participate in the games.106  His parents immediately sued to 
allow John to play.  While the litigation was pending, John was permitted to 
serve as a team manager during his freshman year in 1990, and then practice 
with the team but not play in games during his sophomore year in 1991. 
a) The District Court Decision in Williams 
John’s case was first heard in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania in 1992.  The plaintiffs asserted that: 
[T]he defendant’s exclusion of John Williams from the girls’ field hockey team, 
which effectively bars him from playing that sport since there is no school field 
hockey team for boys, violates Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 
and its implementing regulations, the Pennsylvania Constitution, specifically 
the Equal Rights Amendment thereof, and both the Equal Protection and Due 
Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.107 
The judge issued a summary judgment on John’s behalf, allowing him to play 
field hockey during his junior year in the fall of 1992.  The district court found 
that John’s expulsion from the team violated both Title IX and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.108 
With regard to Title IX, the defendant school district alleged that field 
hockey is a contact sport and that the athletic opportunities for boys had not 
previously been limited in the school district.109  The district court ruled as a mat-
ter of law that field hockey is not a contact sport since the defendants could not 
prove that “bodily contact is the purpose or a major activity of field hockey.”110  
The court incorrectly examined whether bodily contact was itself a major activ-
ity in the sport of field hockey rather than whether bodily contact is involved 
with the major activity as the regulation requires.111  The court further erred by 
dismissing the regulation’s inclusion of other sports besides the five mentioned 
as contact sports by stating, “In the first instance, a number of contact sports are 
 
 105. Williams v. The School District of Bethlehem, 799 F. Supp. 513, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1992), rev’d,  998 
F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 106. Williams, 799 F. Supp. at 514. 
 107. Id. at 515. 
108
 Id. at 518-522. 
 109. Id. at 515-16. 
 110. Id. at 517. 
 111. Id. At 516-17. 
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enumerated in § 106.41(b), including ice hockey.  The omission of field hockey 
suggests that this sport was not recognized as a contact sport when the rule was 
drafted.”112 
As for the other critical piece of Title IX analysis, the court ruled that boys’ 
athletic opportunities at the high school had indeed been previously limited.113  
The court noted that girls could try out for all of the boys’ teams offered at 
John’s high school, but boys could not try out for any girls’ team.114 “[T]he record 
demonstrates that as a consequence of this plan for expanding opportunities for 
girls in athletics, such opportunities are now limited for boys and have been 
since 1973 when the new athletic policies were implemented.”115 
The court then turned to an analysis of the Equal Protection Clause, and 
found defendants’ policy in violation thereof.116  The defendants claimed that 
their justifications for denying boys from participating on girls’ teams were to 
remedy past discrimination against girls in athletics and to provide equal ath-
letic opportunities for girls.117  The court decided that the need to remedy past 
discrimination was over, since girls in the school district have had access to a 
greater number of sports teams than boys for over eighteen years by the time of 
the litigation.118  The court further noted that any policy justifications for disal-
lowing boys to play with girls based on physical differences were “overbroad 
and unsupported generalizations.”119  Defendants appealed the court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the Third Circuit. 
b) The Third Circuit’s Decision in Williams 
The Third Circuit wasted no time in reversing the district court’s decision, 
disagreeing with the district court on both its Title IX and Equal Protection 
Clause analysis.120  Regarding the contact sports exception, the court stated, “We 
note first that the district court may have misapprehended the legal inquiry.”121  
The court noted that the district court missed a “subtle but important distinc-
tion” between analyzing “whether a major activity of field hockey ‘involves 
bodily contact’ (the regulation’s language) or whether bodily contact ‘is the pur-
pose or major activity of field hockey,’ the language used by the district court 
and the plaintiffs.”122  The court concluded that the “major activity” prong of the 
contact exception test was meant to account for “the realities of the situation on 
the playing field.”123  The court found that “bodily contact does in fact occur fre-
quently and is expected to occur during the game,”124 thereby concluding that 
 
 112. Id. at 516. 
 113. Id. at 518. 
 114. Id. at 516-17. 
 115. Id. at 517. 
 116. Id. at 518-21. 
 117. Id. at 519. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 520 (quoting Haffer v. Temple University, 678 F. Supp. 517, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1987)). 
 120. Williams v. School District of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 169-70 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 121. Id. at 173. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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the defendants had raised an issue of material fact sufficient to overturn the dis-
trict court’s summary judgment on that point.125 
The court then went on to examine whether athletic opportunities for boys 
had previously been limited, noting still that “if it is determined that field 
hockey is a contact sport, no other inquiry is necessary because that will be dis-
positive of the Title IX claim.”126  The court found that athletic opportunities 
should be examined generally, rather than specifically for a particular sport.127  
Even though girls were permitted to try out for boys’ teams, “‘athletic opportu-
nities’ means real opportunities, not illusory ones.”128  The court determined that 
a fact-finder ought to decide whether the physical differences between high 
school boys and high school girls, in reality, “negate the significance of allowing 
girls to try out for boys’ teams but not allowing the reverse.”129 
Turning to the Equal Protection claims, the Circuit Court found that the 
district court lacked sufficient information to grant a summary judgment on this 
point since it dismissed without a fact-finder an inquiry into the physical differ-
ences between high school girls and boys.130  The court noted that past discrimi-
nation against girls in athletics did exist.131 But whether excluding boys from the 
field hockey team is a permissible way to address this depends on “whether 
there are genuine physical differences between boys and girls or whether, in-
stead, the policy is based on unwarranted and stereotyped assumptions about 
the sexes.”132 
The Circuit Court reversed and remanded John’s case.  A re-hearing was 
denied during the summer of 1993,133 the summer before John’s senior year.  The 
Williams’ writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was also           
denied.134 
2. Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association135 
In the spring of 1979, while Title IX’s policy interpretations and implemen-
tations were still being finalized, Massachusetts’ State Board of Education peti-
tioned the state’s Attorney General to challenge a state rule barring high school 
boys from playing on girls’ teams.  The Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic 
Association (the “Association”) had promulgated a rule stating that “No boy 
may play on a girls’ team,” even though girls could tryout for boys’ teams.136  
 
 125. Id. at 173-74. 
 126. Id. at 174. 
 127. Id. at 173. 
 128. Id. at 175. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 178. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Williams v. School District of Bethlehem, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 19717 (3d. Cir. 1993). 
 134. Williams v. School District of Bethlehem, 510 U.S. 1043 (1994). 
 135. Attorney Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 393 N.E.2d 284, (Mass. 1979). 
 136. Attorney Gen. v. Mass., 393 N.E.2d at 287.  The full text of the rule in question is “With due 
regard to protecting the welfare and safety of all students participating in MIAA athletics: 1) No boy 
may play on a girls’ team.  2) A girl may play on a boys’ team if that sport is not offered in the school 
for the girl.”  Id. 
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The Association had earlier tabbed field hockey as a girls-only sport, thereby 
precluding boys from trying-out for or playing on high school field hockey 
teams in the state.  The Attorney General chose to challenge the rule under Mas-
sachusetts’ new Equal Rights Amendment to the state constitution.137 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts struck down the Associa-
tion’s ban on boys playing on girls’ teams, deciding that the rule was overly 
broad.138 The court noted that the ban “attacks a small problem with heavy artil-
lery,” since only a few boys had wanted to play girls’ sports at only a handful of 
high schools.139  The court addressed the Equal Protection Clause, noting that it 
“condemn[s] discrimination on the grounds of sex—whether male or female.”140  
The court recognized under this analysis that while “in the field of athletics, 
where opportunities in the past have grossly favored males, it remains the fact 
that some of the less athletic men have been denied active participation in com-
petitive sports in part because of sex segregation.”141 
Rather than ruling on federal statutory or constitutional grounds, the court 
used the state’s Equal Rights Amendment to find the rule banning boys from 
girls’ teams “prima facie invalid.”142  Applying strict scrutiny under state law, 
rather than intermediate level scrutiny, the court ruled that no compelling state 
interest existed for banning all boys from all girls’ teams, since “classification on 
strict grounds of sex, without reference to actual skill differentials in particular 
sports, would merely echo ‘archaic and overbroad generalizations.’”143  An      
alternative to a strict ban on boys playing field hockey which would be permis-
sible would be “use of standards focusing on height, weight, or skill rather than 
solely on gender.”144  Rules could also limit the number of boys on the field at 
any one time.145 
The Massachusetts approach provides a good model for use by states that 
do not want to see “hulking teenage piles of testosterone” dominating smaller 
girls, but who are sympathetic to the desire of some boys to play field hockey.  
While determining exactly what height and weight restrictions to apply may  
become too arbitrary, limiting the number of boys on the field at any one time, 
to one or two for instance, represents a fair compromise. 
 
 137. “Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or 
national origin.”  MASS. CONST. art. I. 
 138. Attorney Gen, 393 N.E.2d at 296. 
 139. Id. at 288. 
 140. Id. at 289. 
 141. Id. at 290. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 293 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)). The court went on to 
quote Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, (D. Colo. 1975), “Any notion that young women are 
so inherently weak, delicate or physically inadequate that the state must protect them from the folly 
of participation in vigorous athletics is a cultural anachronism unrelated to reality.”  Id. at 169. 
 144. Attorney Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 393 N.E.2d 284, 295 (Mass. 1979). 
 145. Id. 
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3. Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League146 
In the fall of 1990, Brian Kleczek, a sophomore at Kingstown High School in 
Rhode Island, tried out for and made the girls’ junior varsity field hockey 
team.147  No female players had to be cut in order to make a roster spot for 
Brian.148  There were open spaces on the team.149  Furthermore, the coach and 
Brian’s fellow players, all girls, were not opposed to Brian staying on the team.150  
Knowing that Rhode Island Interscholastic League (RIIL) rules prohibited boys 
from playing on girls’ athletic teams, Brian’s principal and coach petitioned for 
an exception on Brian’s behalf.151  An RIIL committee held a hearing regarding 
the matter but unanimously voted against approving a waiver and concluded 
that Brian should not be allowed to join the team.152  Brian served as the team 
manager that season.153  Complex litigation resulted, making stops along its path 
at the United States District Court, the Rhode Island Superior Court, and finally 
to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island.154 
a) The District Court Decision in Kleczek 
Upon learning that Brian would not be permitted to play on the girls’ field 
hockey team in the fall of 1990, his parents filed for a preliminary injunction in 
the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.  The complaint 
alleged that the RIIL violated Brian’s rights under Title IX and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Rhode Island State 
Constitution.155  In order for the preliminary injunction to be granted, the plain-
tiffs would need to “demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits” of the 
federal claims, since the case was in federal court based on federal question ju-
risdiction.156  The court therefore first analyzed the merits of the RIIL ban on 
boys playing field hockey under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. 
Regarding the Title IX claim, the court found both that boys’ athletic oppor-
tunities had not been limited at Kingstown High School and that field hockey is 
a contact sport.  According to the court, either of those findings would alone 
have been enough to thwart Brian’s Title IX claim.157  In analyzing whether the 
athletic opportunities test should be applied generally to all sports or specifi-
cally to field hockey, the court criticized and rejected an earlier Rhode Island 
case holding that such analysis should be specific to field hockey.158  The court 
 
 146. Kleczek v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 768 F. Supp. 951 (D.R.I. 1991). 
 147. Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at  952. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, No. 91-5475, 1991 R.I. Super. LEXIS 101, at *1 (R.I. Super., 
Sept. 27, 1991), vacated by, 612 A. 2d 734 (R.I. 1992). 
 151. Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 953. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, 612 A.2d 734 (R.I. 1992). 
 155. Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 953. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See infra Part II. 
 158. Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955 (discussing Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 
F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I. 1979). 
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noted that the prior construction “disregarded the plain language of the regula-
tion and substituted new language to avoid a feared constitutional problem.”159  
The court finally held that “under the obvious plain meaning of the statute regu-
lation, Brian need not be provided the opportunity to play on the girls’ field 
hockey team because athletic opportunities at Kingstown High School have not 
previously been limited for members of his sex.”160 
Any possible disagreement between the district court and state court        
regarding the athletic opportunity test was rendered moot when the district 
court further held that field hockey is a contact sport.161  The court compared 
field hockey to the sports described in the regulation as contact sports, and de-
termined that “field hockey is an ‘incidental contact’ sport, more akin to basket-
ball than volleyball or tennis.”162  Finding that the major activity of field hockey 
involves bodily contact, the court concluded, “Although the purpose of field 
hockey is not to make bodily contact, such contact is inevitable in a sport that 
combines running, sticks, a hard ball, and a wide-open playing field.”163 
The court also found Brian’s claim of an Equal Protection violation want-
ing.  After noting that the state-sponsored, gender-based exclusion of boys play-
ing girls’ field hockey would receive intermediate level review, the court simply 
stated that “clearly a substantial relationship [exists] between the exclusion of 
males from the team and the goal of redressing past discrimination and provid-
ing equal opportunities for women.”164  Since the court found that redressing 
past discrimination against women in athletics and promoting female participa-
tion are “beyond question,” important governmental interests, and “excluding 
males from female teams is substantially related to achieving that objective,” 
Brian’s equal protection claim was dismissed.165  Having rejected Brian’s two 
federal claims, the court refused to address the state law claims since federal 
question jurisdiction was then lacking.166 
b) The Rhode Island Superior Court Decision in Kleczek 
Having failed in federal court on the Title IX and Equal Protection Clause 
complaints, the Kleczeks next turned to state court, arguing that the RIIL’s ban 
on boys playing on girls’ teams violated the Rhode Island Constitution.  Article 
I, Section II of the Rhode Island Constitution states, “No otherwise qualified 
person shall, solely by reason of race, gender or handicap be subject to discrimi-
 
 159. Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at  955. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See infra Part II. C. 
 162. Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at  955-56. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. (quoting Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass’n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982)).  To 
reiterate the intermediate level scrutiny test, the state must show that a gender-based classification 
serves “important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed” are “sub-
stantially related to the achievement of those objectives.”  Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 
718, 724 (1982). 
 165. Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 956. 
 166. Id. 
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nation by the state, its agents or any person or entity doing business with the 
state.”167 
Interestingly, although Article I, Section II of the Rhode Island Constitution 
had been adopted in 1986, by 1991 the provision still had “yet to be interpreted 
by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.”168  After a review of other states’ interpre-
tation of their equal rights amendments, the court decided that strict scrutiny 
would apply to the RIIL’s ban.169  The court then relied heavily on the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court’s Attorney General analysis.170  The court noted, along with 
the Massachusetts court, “that less offensive and better calculated alternatives 
exist for promoting the purported interest in advancing girls’ athletics, than a 
blanket ban on boys’ participation.”171  Addressing paternalism concerns, the 
court noted that the ban on boys “is counterproductive and simply reinforces 
the insidious notion of female inferiority.”172  The court granted the Kleczek’s 
preliminary injunction during the middle of the field hockey season in Brian’s 
junior year.173  Brian was allowed to play field hockey with the girls’ team for 
several days.174 
c) The Rhode Island Supreme Court Decision in Kleczek 
The RIIL filed an immediate writ of certiorari to the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court, seeking an injunction blocking enforcement of the Superior Court deci-
sion as well as a review of the decision.175  The writ and the injunction were    
immediately granted, and Brian had to sit out for the rest of the season.  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court then reversed the lower court holding that, with 
regard to the Rhode Island Constitution, intermediate level scrutiny “is particu-
larly appropriate for gender classifications that effect athletic opportunities for 
boys and girls.  Because of innate physiological differences, boys and girls are 
not similarly situated as they enter athletic competition.  Some classifications 
based on gender may therefore be justified.  The classifications can reflect rea-
soned judgment rather than prejudice.”176  Brian lost his challenge. 
In a 1998 article discussing the issue of boys playing on girls field hockey 
teams, the Wall Street Journal caught-up with Brian Kleczek, who discussed the 
few days in between the Superior Court ruling and the Supreme Court’s injunc-
tion: 
 
 167. R.I. CONST. art. I, § II. 
 168. Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, No. 91-5475, 1991 R.I. Super. LEXIS 101, at *5 (R.I. Super., 
Sept. 27, 1991), vacated by, 612 A. 2d 734 (R.I. 1992). 
 169. Id. at *11. 
 170. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 171. Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, No. 91-5475, 1991 R.I. Super. LEXIS 101, at *13 (R.I. Su-
per., Sept. 27, 1991) (quoting Attorney Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 393 N.E.2d 
284, 294 (Mass. 1979), vacated by, 612 A. 2d 734 (R.I. 1992). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See White, supra note 14, at B1. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, 612 A. 2d 734 (R.I. 1992). 
 176. Id. at 738. 
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One week later, Brian, then in the fall of his junior year, was set to make his     
debut.  “I never practiced any harder than that week,” he says.  But when the 
big day came, he was called to the principal’s office to learn that a member of 
the state Supreme Court had temporarily blocked the lower court’s ruling.  The 
Supreme Court later rejected his sex-discrimination argument. 
After graduating, Brian applied to be the girls’ field hockey coach, but was 
turned down for that, too.  Now 24 . . . [Brian] predicts that eventually pressure 
from boys will force the integration of his favorite sport.  But for now he is “tak-
ing a break from field hockey.”177 
4. Maine Human Rights Commission v. Maine Principals Association 
In 1996, and again in 1997, Jeremy Ellis tried out for the Portland High 
School girls’ field hockey team and was barred from participating.  In 1998, 
Jessie Turcotte suffered the same fate at St. Dominic’s High School.  The high 
schools refused to allow the boys to try out or play for the field hockey teams 
because the Maine Principals Association (MPA), which organizes interscholas-
tic athletics in Maine, enacted a rule causing a team which plays a boy in compe-
tition to forfeit the game for purposes of post season play—effectively banning 
boys from girls’ field hockey.178  The Maine Human Rights Commission brought 
a lawsuit on the boys’ behalf alleging a violation of Maine’s Human Rights Act, 
rather than a violation of Title IX of the Equal Protection Clause.  Still, the courts 
analysis covered those topics, especially since the MPA enacted the forfeit rule 
in order to comply with Title IX.179 
In order to comply with Title IX’s mandates, the MPA promulgated athletic 
regulations for Maine high schools designed to “provide an overall equal ath-
letic opportunity for both sexes.”180  The court agreed with the MPA’s construc-
tion of the athletic opportunity test, meaning that the boys would have to show 
that overall athletic opportunities for boys have been limited in general at their 
high schools rather than specifically in the sport of field hockey.181  Since overall 
athletic opportunities for high school boys had not been limited in the past, 
there was no need to examine whether field hockey was a contact sport.  With 
the court making this finding, the boys’ claim was doomed to fail.182 
The court explained that in Maine, since so many boys and so few girls play 
football, an additional fall sport needed to be played that would effectively     
 
 177. White, supra note 14, at B1. 
 178. Me. Human Rights Comm’n  v. Me. Principals Ass’n, No. CV-97-599, 1999 Me. Super. LEXIS 
23, at *12-13 (Me. Super. Jan. 21, 1999). 
 179. The language of the MPA’s athletic regulations mirrors that of the policy interpretations of 
Title IX.  See id. at *5-6. 
 180. Id. at *6. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Id. at *7-8 ( “The plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proof to show that they 
have been denied equal athletic opportunity.  They have offered no evidence concerning program 
wide disparity in provision of equipment and supplies; scheduling of games and practice time; 
travel and per diem allowance; opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring; assignment 
of coaches, tutors, and officials; provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities, medi-
cal and training machine facilities and services, rooming and dining facilities and services, suppor-
tive services and benefits or any disproportion in expenditures.”). 
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accommodate the needs and interests of girls.183  The sport chosen was field 
hockey.  The court reasoned that “a rule change permitting coeducational field 
hockey would diminish the extent to which sports effectively accommodate the 
interests and abilities of girls during the fall athletic season.”184  Borrowing a 
page from equal protection analysis, the court finally concluded, “the evidence 
establishes that there is a substantial relationship between excluding boys from 
playing field hockey and providing equal opportunities for girls in athletics.”185 
Though the plaintiffs did not allege that the MPA had violated Title IX or 
the Equal Protection Clause, the court still used pieces of analysis applicable to 
those statutes.186  The rationale was that boys could be excluded even under    Ti-
tle IX, since athletic opportunities for boys in general have not been limited in 
the past.187  Likewise, the important governmental objective of providing equal 
athletic opportunity for girls is furthered by not allowing (arguably athletically 
superior) boys to fill up roster spots on girls’ field hockey teams.188 
5. B.C. v. Board of Education, Cumberland Regional School District 
In 1984, a boy referred to as “C.C.” played on the Cumberland High School 
junior varsity girls’ field hockey team in New Jersey.  Several opposing teams 
complained to the New Jersey State Athletic Association (NJSAA) about this,  
indicating that if C.C. were to play on his school’s varsity field hockey team, 
“they would actively recruit males for their girls’ field hockey teams thereby 
displacing otherwise eligible girls.”189  Responding to these concerns, in the 
spring of 1985, the NJSAA adopted a resolution stating, “Males shall be            
excluded from female athletic teams although there are no teams for boys in the 
same sport   until such time as both sexes are afforded overall equal athletic    
opportunities.”190  C.C. and his parents challenged the resolution in an adminis-
trative law proceeding.  The administrative law judge (ALJ) sided with C.C.,  
deciding that “male participation on girls’ field hockey teams would not have a 
detrimental impact.”191  The NJSAA’s Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s conclu-
sion, and C.C.’s parents appealed the Commissioner’s decision to New Jersey 
Superior Court.192 
The appeal was based on New Jersey state constitutional grounds, but the 
court still relied on Title IX and Equal Protection Clause analysis in its deci-
sion.193  The court articulated that “sex-based classification can withstand consti-
 
 183. Id. at *9-10. 
 184. Id. at *16. 
 185. Id.  The court goes on to state, “Conversely, the evidence also establishes that permitting 
boys to compete with girls will likely result in an overall lessening of equal opportunities for girls in 
athletics.” Id. 
 186. See id. at *14-16. 
 187. Id. at 12-13. 
 188. Id. at 14-16. 
 189. B.C. v. Bd. of Educ., Cumberland Reg’l Sch. Dist., 531 A.2d 1059, 1061 (N.J. Super. 
A.D.,1987). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 1062. 
 192. Id. at 1063. 
 193. Id. at 1064-65. 
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tutional challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment where the actual purpose 
of the discrimination is to compensate for past discrimination.”194  Using that cri-
teria, the court ruled that the NJSAA ban did act to prevent “males from domi-
nating and displacing females from meaningful participation in available ath-
letic opportunities.”195  The court finally concluded, “The governmental      
interest in promoting equality of athletic opportunities is advanced by the exclu-
sion of C.C.’s participation on the girls’ field hockey team.”196 
The court also addressed the contact sports exception, though not as part of 
the major holding of the case.  The ALJ had decided initially that “although     
incidental contact may occur, field hockey is not a contact sport.”197  The NJSAA 
Commissioner specifically rejected this conclusion, noting that the presence of 
incidental contact was enough to characterize field hockey as a contact sport,   
especially if boys were to play due to the “physiological differences between 
boys and girls.”198  The court acquiesced with the Commissioner’s characteriza-
tion.199  In the end, the court rejected C.C.’s complaint and affirmed the Commis-
sioner’s decision to ban C.C. from playing on the girls’ field hockey team. 
B. Analysis of the Cases 
In analyzing the above cases and their final outcomes, some general con-
clusions can be made with regard to how courts have treated boys’ arguments 
that they should be allowed to play girls’ field hockey under Title IX and the 
Equal Protection Clause.  First, under Title IX, no case resulted in the conclusion 
that the athletic opportunity test needed to be read specifically in terms of field 
hockey rather than generally covering all male high school athletic participation.  
This means that since it is still absurd at most high schools to suggest that boys’ 
athletic opportunities have been restricted in the past compared with girls gen-
erally, the Title IX argument will likely fail.200  Furthermore, in the cases where it 
was an issue, all of the courts making final decisions determined that field 
hockey is a contact sport, which is also enough to justify an exclusion of boys.201 
Second, under the Equal Protection Clause, the courts all recognized that 
redressing past discrimination against girls in high school athletics is an impor-
tant governmental objective.  The courts that applied intermediate level scrutiny 
all found that bans on boys playing girls’ field hockey passed muster.  The lone 
hold-out was Massachusetts, where the court applied strict scrutiny under its 
state constitution’s equal rights amendment. 
 
 194. Id. at 1065. 
 195. Id. at 1065. 
 196. Id. at 1066. 
 197. Id. at 1067. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 1068. 
 200. There could be the rare girls-only high school that begins to admit boys. 
 201. See infra Part II.C. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Boys cannot claim a right under federal law to play on girls’ high school 
field hockey teams.  Under federal law, if states choose to permit boys to play 
high school field hockey they may. However, they are not required to unless the 
state has a more stringent equal protection right under the state constitution 
than is currently recognized under the federal Constitution.  If a state chooses to 
ban boys from playing field hockey, the boys who challenge these decisions 
should look somewhere else besides Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause for a 
redress of their grievances. 
So what about Kenny?  While Kenny does not have a federal statutory or 
constitutional right to play girls’ high school field hockey, should he still be 
permitted to play?  As sports in America, especially at the high school level, con-
tinue to see a breakdown of traditional gender boundaries,202 states should be 
encouraged to allow boys to play girls field hockey, within limits such as those 
suggested by the Massachusetts Supreme Court.  States could set height and 
weight limitations on boys allowed to participate,203 and could limit the number 
of roster spots boys can fill and the number of boys allowed on the field at any 
time.204  This would be a fair way to address safety and competitive fairness con-
cerns as well as accommodate Kenny’s desire to play field hockey. 
 
 202. See infra INTRODUCTION. 
 203. This would be an arbitrary exercise, but what about no boys over 5’10 and 160 pounds, for 
instance? 
 204. A provision along the lines of no more than three or four boys on a varsity roster and no 
more than one or two boys on the field per team at any given time seems reasonable. 
